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1 Introduction
Research in emerging markets finance has been rapidly expanding over the past two
decades, see Bekaert and Harvey (2002, 2003) for comprehensive surveys of the past,
present and future of the area. Relatively few studies exist that investigate individ-
ual stock selection for emerging markets, see Claessens, Dasgupta and Glen (1998),
Fama and French (1998), Patel (1998), Achour et al. (1998, 1999a,b,c), Rouwenhorst
(1999), Barry et al. (2002), and van der Hart, Slagter and van Dijk (2003). The gen-
eral conclusion from these studies appears to be that stock selection strategies that
work well in developed markets also generate significant outperformance in emerging
markets. The most recent analysis by van der Hart et al. (2003), based on almost
3000 securities from 32 countries and an extensive set of selection strategies, finds
that in internationally diversified (but country-neutral) portfolios, value stocks out-
perform growth stocks, past winners (based on six-month momentum) outperform
past losers, and stocks with (relatively) high analysts’ earnings revisions outperform
stocks with low revisions.
There is an ongoing debate concerning the underlying reasons for (or the appro-
priate interpretation of) the profitability of value, momentum and revisions strate-
gies. Roughly speaking, on the one hand, the excess returns of these stock selection
strategies are believed to be compensation for risk involved, whereas on the other
hand they are attributed to behavioral biases, with investors either under- or over-
reacting to the release of new firm-specific information. To add to this discussion, in
this paper we perform an ‘out-of-sample’ test of these competing explanations, by
examining whether they can account for the profitability of stock selection strategies
in emerging markets. As most research in this area has been conducted for developed
markets, emerging markets provide an excellent opportunity to study the source of
return premiums on a relatively independent sample.
We find that both emerging market risk and global factor risk (using a four-
factor model including market, book-to-market, size and momentum factors) cannot
explain the excess returns of the selection strategies in emerging markets. Relatively
few factor loadings are found to be significant, while excess returns of the strategies
remain of the same magnitude and significant after accounting for risk. We find more
convincing evidence in favor of behavioral explanations for value and momentum
anomalies put forward in the context of developed markets. In addition, we present
new results supporting an underrreaction effect for the earnings revisions strategy.
For value strategies, our findings are in accordance with the underreaction or ex-
trapolation hypothesis developed in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), which
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posits that the outperformance of value stocks arises because investors systemat-
ically underestimate the earnings growth prospects of such stocks. We find that
the actual earnings growth of value stocks in emerging markets equals the average
earnings growth after just a few years, indicating that the difference in valuation
between value and growth stocks indeed is not justified by subsequent earnings de-
velopments. At the same time, we find that the evidence for emerging markets is
also in line with the results of Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2002), who document
that analysts in fact are more optimistic about value than growth stocks, seemingly
contradicting the behavioral interpretation of Lakonishok et al (1994). We suggest
a possible reconciliation for these contrasting views, based on the idea that the most
important behavioral bias is related to underestimation of long term earnings growth
prospects for value stocks. This is supported by our finding that analysts’ forecast
errors (defined as actual earnings minus the corresponding earnings forecast) and
earnings revisions for value stocks are below average only up until approximately
one year after portfolio formation. After this initial period, analysts indeed become
less optimistic about value than growth stocks. In addition, we observe that the
expected earnings growth for value stocks improves quite rapidly and exceeds the
average expected growth within two years after portfolio formation.
For the momentum strategy, we find elements of both underreaction and overre-
action, in agreement with the evidence from developed markets. On the one hand,
stocks with high past returns have higher earnings forecast errors and earnings revi-
sions for about one year after portfolio formation, indicating an underreaction effect,
similar to the findings of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) for the US. On
the other hand, in line with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Nagel (2002), we also
find that momentum strategies have a pronounced reversal in excess returns between
three and five years after portfolio formation, indicating an overreaction effect.
For the earnings revisions strategy, our results lend unequivocal support to an
underreaction explanation. In line with the US evidence of Chan et al. (1996) and
our own findings for the emerging markets momentum strategy, stocks with high
past earnings revisions continue to have earnings revisions (and earnings forecast
errors) above average for about one year after portfolio formation. Contrary to the
momentum strategy, we find no return reversal for the earnings revisions strategy
up until five years after portfolio formation, indicating a distinct difference between
these strategies. To the best of our knowledge, return reversals for earnings revisions
strategies have not been examined before, even for developed markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and stock
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selection strategies. Section 3 summarizes the results concerning their profitability
and the robustness thereof. Sections 4 and 5 explore the competing explanations
for the excess returns of the strategies in terms of risk and behavior, respectively.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
Stock returns, earnings and book value data are drawn from the S&P/IFC Emerging
Markets database. Monthly total stock returns are measured in US dollars, and
account for dividends, stock splits and other capital adjustments, cf. Rouwenhorst
(1999). The returns contain some extreme observations, which are at least partly
due to data errors. To avoid a potentially disrupting impact from large data errors,
we compare the total returns from S&P/IFC with corresponding total returns from
the Factset Pricing database, as well as with price returns from both sources. In
case of extreme return observations with large differences between the data sources,
we use the smallest absolute value to err on the side of caution. In addition, we cap
monthly returns at 300% or 150%, depending on whether or not the S&P/IFC data
is confirmed by Factset Pricing.
We exclude stocks that are not included in the IFC Investable Composite index1
and stocks that have a real investable market value less than 100 million in Decem-
ber 1998 US dollars, applying a 10 percent annual inflation rate. This makes the
selection strategies feasible for a large international investor, while it also mitigates
the problem of survivorship bias in the Emerging Markets database, due to back-
filled data for some countries in the period before inclusion in the IFC Investable
Composite index, see Harvey (1995) for detailed discussion. In addition, we omit
countries with less than four stocks and countries for which the data necessary for
1The IFC Investable Composite Index consists of stocks from the following countries, with the
first month of inclusion in parenthesis. In case two months are provided, the second indicates
the last month of inclusion. Latin America: Argentina (Dec 1988), Brazil (Dec 1988), Chile (Dec
1988), Colombia (Feb 1991 - Nov 2001), Mexico (Dec 1988), Peru (Jan 1994), Venezuela (Jan 1990
- Nov 2001); Asia: China (Oct 1995), India (Nov 1992), Indonesia (Sep 1990), Korea (Jan 1992),
Malaysia (Dec 1988), Pakistan (Mar 1991 - Nov 2001), Philippines (Dec 1988), Sri Lanka (Jan
1994 - Nov 2001), Taiwan (Jan 1991), Thailand (Dec 1988); Europe: Czech Republic (Jan 1996),
Greece (Dec 1988 - Apr 2001), Hungary (Apr 1994), Poland (Apr 1994), Portugal (Dec 1988 - Mar
1999), Russia (Nov 1997), Slovakia (Nov 1997 - Nov 2001), Turkey (Aug 1989); Africa & Middle
East: Egypt (Nov 1997), Israel (Dec 1996), Jordan (Dec 1988 - Nov 2001), Morocco (Nov 1997),
South Africa (Apr 1995), and Zimbabwe (Apr 1994 - Nov 2001). Malaysia was not included during
the period Oct 1998 - Oct 1999.
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the particular selection strategy is available for less than 30 percent of the stocks.
We discard these “small” countries because the selection strategies construct local
return factor portfolios from the top and bottom 15 percent stocks in each country
separately.
The data from S&P/IFC are supplemented with analysts’ earnings forecasts from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). These are used to compute earn-
ings revisions, defined as the number of analysts with upward revisions minus the
number of analysts with downward revisions divided by the total number of analysts
providing an earnings forecast in a particular month, following Achour et al. (1998).
Combining the different databases, we implement the stock selection strategies
described below over the period from December 1988, the inception month of the
IFC Investable Composite index, until June 2004. The number of stocks that are
used for testing the strategies starts at about 100 in December 1988, grows quite
rapidly to about 700 in 1994 and varies between 600 and 900 stocks in the remaining
years.
2.2 Stock Selection Strategies
We investigate stock selection strategies based on the value indicators book-to-
market (B/M) and earnings-to-price (E/P), based on momentum as measured by the
total return over the previous six months (6MR), and based on analysts’ earnings
revisions, measured by the past three-month average earnings revisions for the cur-
rent fiscal year (ER FY1). The methodology underlying the portfolio construction
is described below.
All strategies are applied without a delay between the moment of ranking and
the moment of portfolio formation. As the IFC and IBES databases contain data
as published, all sorting characteristics would have been available to investors at
the time of ranking and, hence, the selection strategies do not use any future in-
formation.2 At the beginning of each month, we rank the stocks by country on
each of the above characteristics in descending order. For each country in the sam-
ple, equally weighted ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ portfolios are formed from the 15 percent
2Apart from worries about the timely availability of the sorting variables, another reason to
implement momentum strategies with a delay (usually of one-month) is to attenuate the effects
of bid-ask bounce, see Achour et al. (1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999), among others. Because of
the minimum capitalization requirement that we impose, the smallest, and probably least liquid,
stocks are not included in our sample and, hence, bid-ask bounce is less important at the monthly
frequency. Therefore, we also implement the momentum strategies without delay, such that, for
example, the 6-month momentum factor that is used to rank the stocks at the beginning of month
t is based on the average return from the beginning of month t − 6 to the end of month t − 1.
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stocks ranked highest and lowest, respectively.3 These country portfolios are then
combined into internationally diversified portfolios, in which each stock receives an
equal weight. Each month, new portfolios are constructed which are held for a pe-
riod of six months. After formation, the portfolios are not rebalanced, except to
account for stocks leaving the IFC Investables index. These stocks exit the relevant
portfolio and the weights of the remaining stocks are adjusted proportionally. As we
construct new portfolios every month and use a six-month holding period, at any
point in time the strategies effectively hold stocks from six portfolios, each formed
one month apart. To handle the problems concerned with overlapping returns, we
calculate monthly returns for a particular strategy as the average of the returns on
the six similar portfolios, cf. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Rouwenhorst
(1998).
3 Profitability of Stock Selection Strategies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the stock selection strategies based on
value, momentum and earnings revisions. Table 1 shows the average monthly returns
during the six-month holding period for the top portfolio, an equally weighted index
consisting of all stocks in the relevant sample (EWI) and the bottom portfolio, as
well as the excess returns of the top portfolio versus the equally weighted index
(TMI) and versus the bottom portfolio (TMB).
All four selection strategies prove to be successful, in the sense that the excess
returns of the top portfolio are positive and strongly statistically significant. Com-
pared to the EWI, the average monthly excess returns of the top portfolio vary from
0.24% for the earnings revisions strategy to 0.53% for the B/M strategy. The aver-
age returns for the top versus bottom portfolio range between 0.59% and 0.74% per
month, with the highest average return for the momentum strategy and the lowest
again for the earnings revisions strategy. These magnitudes of the strategies’ excess
returns are similar to those found in van der Hart et al. (2003), as well as the results
reported in Rouwenhorst (1999) for B/M and momentum and in Achour et al. (1998)
for earnings revisions.
3Stocks are selected in each country separately to avoid any implicit country allocation. We ex-
amine the added value of country selection by ranking stocks globally and forming equally weighted
portfolios consisting of the top and bottom 15 percent stocks in this alternative ranking. We find
that such ‘global ranking’ adds considerably to the profitability of the stock selection strategies.
The excess returns due to country selection are, however, much more volatile than the excess
returns due to stock selection.
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It is worth noting that in case the performance of the top portfolio is measured
relative to the bottom portfolio, the excess returns generated by the B/M, E/P
and 6MR strategies are very close. In contrast, when the top portfolio is compared
with the EWI, the B/M strategy markedly outperforms the other two strategies, by
approximately 0.2% per month. Hence, for the E/P and 6MR strategies a substantial
part of the profits from a zero-investment strategy based on the TMB portfolio would
come from the sell side, while this is not the case for the B/M strategy. Because
of short sales restrictions in emerging markets, implementing the TMB strategy as
a zero-investment strategy may not be feasible in practice; see Bekaert and Urias
(1996), Alexander (2000) and and De Roon, Nijman and Werker (2001). The E/P
and 6-month momentum strategies therefore are mostly relevant for avoiding or
underweighting ‘bad’ stocks, see Achour et al. (1998).
To analyze the stability of the strategies’ performance, Figure 1 plots 12-month
moving average excess returns of the top portfolios relative to the EWI, while Table
2 shows the TMI excess returns for three five-year subsample periods. All strategies
have positive excess returns in all three subperiods, and most excess returns are
statistically significant. For the B/M strategy, the average excess return decreased
considerably over time, from 0.84% over the period July 1989-June 1994 to 0.39%
over the period July 1994-June 2004. In contrast, for the E/P and earnings revi-
sions strategies the excess returns were quite stable across sub-periods, while the
performance of the momentum strategy even improved notably over time. Finally,
Figure 1 reveals that the B/M strategy was heavily affected by the Asia crisis in
1997 during which it underperformed relative to the EWI, while the momentum and
earnings revisions strategies had negative excess returns following the Russia crisis
in 1998. In contrast, the performance of the E/P strategy was affected to a much
lesser extent during these periods.
In the following sections we explore the different explanations for the apparent
success of stock selection strategies in emerging markets as documented above, in
terms of exposure to risk and in terms of behavioral biases.
4 Risk-Based Explanations for the Profitability of
Selection Strategies
If the selection strategies tended to select stocks with high sensitivity to overall
movements in emerging equity markets, their excess returns would possibly only be
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a reward for this additional risk. To examine this possibility, we use the regression
Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βEM(REM,t − Rf,t) + εt, (1)
where Rp,t is the monthly return on the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio
of a particular strategy, RM,t is the corresponding benchmark return on the equally
weighted index consisting of all emerging market stocks in our sample (EWI), and
Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill rate.
The estimation results presented in Table 3 show that for all strategies the betas
of the top and bottom portfolios are close to one. Only the B/M strategy appears to
bear higher ‘emerging market risk’, as the betas of its top and bottom portfolios are
significantly greater and less than one, respectively. We find significant deviations
from one for the betas of portfolios of the other three strategies as well, but these
are of the opposite sign as expected under a risk-based explanation. For the E/P
and 6MR strategies, the betas of their bottom portfolios are significantly greater
than one, while the beta of the top portfolio of the earnings revisions strategy is
significantly less than one. The excess returns after correcting for emerging market
risk, as measured by the intercept α in (1), remain statistically significant for all
portfolios except the bottom portfolio of the B/M strategy. They in fact are very
close to the raw excess returns reported in Table 1. In sum, the excess returns of
the stock selection strategies do not appear to be compensation for excess emerging
market risk.
Next, we investigate whether the return and risk properties of the selection strate-
gies depend upon whether the emerging markets as a whole go up or down. This
is motivated by the finding of Ang, Chen, and Xing (2004) that the cross-section of
US stock returns reflects a premium for downside risk; see also Estrada (2000, 2001)
for a downside risk analysis in emerging markets. This is reflected in the model
Rp,t − Rf,t = α
−I{REM,t−Rf,t<0} + β
−
EM
(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t<0}+
α+I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + β
+
EM
(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + εt, (2)
where the returns Rp,t, REM,t and Rf,t are defined as before, and I{A} denotes the
indicator function for the event A, such that I{A} = 1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise.
Hence, β+EM and β
−
EM measure emerging market risk when the market goes up and
down, respectively, while α+ and α− measure the corresponding excess returns. Ta-
ble 4 presents the results from estimating (2) for the top and bottom portfolios of
the four strategies. It is seen that the difference between upside and downside betas
generally is very small, indicating that the strategies do not bear excessive down-
side (or upside) emerging market risk. This being said, we do find more substantial
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differences in excess returns in up and down markets. For example, α− and α+ for
the top portfolio of the B/M strategy are equal to −0.05% and 0.65%, respectively,
indicating that the outperformance of this strategy is attained completely in months
when emerging markets as a whole go up. This contrasts quite sharply with results
for the US in Lakonishok et al. (1994), who document that value stocks outperform
glamour stocks especially in negative market return months. For the E/P and earn-
ings revisions strategies, we also find that excess returns of the top portfolio relative
to the market are larger in positive market return months. Note, however, that
for the E/P strategy the bottom portfolio also performs relatively better in upward
markets, such that the outperformance of the top versus bottom portfolio is not
sensitive to the direction of the overall market. The same holds for the momentum
strategy, although in that case we find that |α+| < |α−|. In sum, the evidence in
Table 4 indicates that the selection strategies do not expose investors to greater
downside (or upside) emerging market risk.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the excess returns are rewards for ex-
posures to global risk factors by using the four-factor regression model developed
by Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Carhart (1997). This model explains port-
folio returns in excess of the risk-free rate (Rp,t − Rf,t) by sensitivities to the ex-
cess return on the market portfolio (RM,t − Rf,t) and the difference between the
returns on portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market values (RHML,t,
HML=High-Minus-Low), on portfolios of stocks with small and large market cap-
italization (RSMB,t, SMB=Small-Minus-Big), and on portfolios of stocks with high
and low momentum (RUMD,t, UMD=Up-Minus-Down). That is, the model is given
by
Rp,t−Rf,t = α+βM(RM,t−Rf,t)+βHMLRHML,t+βSMBRSMB,t+βUMDRUMD,t+εt. (3)
The four-factor model is estimated with Rp,t being the returns on the top and bottom
portfolios in the different strategies, the returns on the equally weighted index of the
corresponding samples of emerging market stocks (EWI), and the TMI and TMB
excess returns. For the TMI and TMB excess return regressions, the risk-free interest
rate is not included on the left-hand side of (3). As proxies for the global risk factors,
we use the US returns data available on the website of Kenneth French.4
The estimation results in Table 5 show a number of interesting features. First,
the estimates of βM are significantly less than one for all top and bottom portfolios
and indexes of emerging market stocks. This finding can probably be attributed to
4http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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the fact that the emerging markets were not completely liberalized and integrated
with global equity markets during our sample period, especially during the first part;
see Bekaert and Harvey (2000a,b) and Edison and Warnock (2003), among others.5
Note that for all selection strategies the betas for the top portfolios are not sig-
nificantly greater than the betas for the corresponding EWI and bottom portfolios.
The resulting estimates of beta when the excess returns of the top portfolio relative
to the EWI or bottom portfolio are used as dependent variable therefore are close to
zero for all selection strategies considered. Second, the returns for the emerging mar-
ket portfolios are positively correlated with the returns for small versus big stocks,
as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant estimates of βSMB for the
top, index and bottom portfolios of all strategies. In contrast, the emerging market
portfolios are virtually insensitive to the HML and UMD factors. The estimates of
βHML are never significant (at the two-sided 5% significance level) for the top, EWI
and bottom portfolios, while the estimate of βUMD is significant only for the bottom
portfolio of the momentum strategy. Third, the sensitivities of the TMI and TMB
excess returns are never significantly different from zero, except for the SMB and
UMD factors in case of the B/M and momentum strategies, respectively. Fourth,
and perhaps most important, the estimated intercepts α for the TMI and TMB ex-
cess returns are significantly different from zero for all strategies, and are very close
to the raw excess returns reported in Table 1. The only exception appears to be the
momentum strategy, for which a sizeable part of the excess return is accounted for
by global momentum risk. Overall, however, global book-to-market, size and mo-
mentum risk factors cannot explain the outperformance of stock selection strategies
in emerging markets. This corroborates the results obtained by Rouwenhorst (1999)
using a two-factor model with only the HML factor included next to the market
portfolio return.
5van der Hart et al. (2003) investigate the effects of financial market liberalization on the per-
formance of stock selection strategies. Estimating the four-factor model separately for returns on
portfolios consisting of stocks from liberalized or non-liberalized countries only, no significant dif-
ferences in factor loadings are found. Alternatively, estimating (3) with a five-year rolling sample
indicated that liberalization did affect the risk properties of the selection strategies, in the sense
that the estimates of βM show a tendency to increase over time. The exposures to the other factors
in the model, as well as the intercept α, also show substantial variation. However, there are no
easily discernible patterns. For example, it is not the case that α gradually declines over time
or becomes insignificant. A more thorough investigation of this issues, using models that allow
the factor loadings to vary with conditioning variables, as in Ferson and Harvey (1999), or that
allow for time-varying integration, as in Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997), is interesting for further
research.
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5 Behavioral Explanations for the Profitability of
Selection Strategies
In this section we explore whether behavioral explanations can account for the suc-
cess of the stock selection strategies in emerging markets. We discuss value strategies
and momentum and earnings revisions strategies separately. Although momentum
and revisions strategies prove to have different features in some respect, they are
treated together as the same characteristics are examined.
5.1 Value Strategies
Lakonishok et al. (1994) provide a behavioral explanation for the significant excess
returns of value strategies. They argue that investors are excessively pessimistic
(optimistic) about future earnings growth of value (growth) stocks, because they
extrapolate past growth rates too far into the future. Using a sample of US stocks and
various measures of growth, including earnings, Lakonishok et al. (1994) demonstrate
that glamour stocks grow much faster than value stocks before portfolio formation.
During the post-formation period, earnings growth rates continue to be lower for
value stocks than for glamour stocks for the first two years, but this pattern is
reversed over the following three years, resulting in approximately equal growth rates
over the complete five-year period. Hence, actual post-formation earnings growth of
value stocks relative to growth stocks turns out to be substantially higher than what
they were during the pre-formation period or than what investors expected them to
be according to multiples such as the E/P ratio. Buying and selling stocks with low
and high expected earnings growth, respectively, then produces excess returns.
To examine whether this behavioral explanation may account for the excess re-
turns of the value strategies in emerging markets, we examine how earnings of the
stocks in the B/M and E/P top portfolios and in the complete sample of stocks
develop after portfolio formation. Figure 2 shows the earnings yield, defined as the
average earnings as a percentage of the initial invested capital, for the first five years
after portfolio formation.
By construction, for the E/P portfolio the earnings yield is higher at formation
date. Over the next 18 to 24 months, average earnings of the E/P top portfolio fall,
whereas earnings of the average stock in the sample increase gradually. However,
the earnings level of the value portfolio remains above that of the average stock in
the sample. More importantly, after approximately 24 months earnings growth rates
are about equal, such that the difference in earnings levels remains fairly constant
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thereafter. For the B/M strategy, we find similar results. Although the difference
in initial earnings yield is much smaller, we do find negative growth during the first
18 months after portfolio formation. This is followed by above average growth in
the subsequent period, such that after three and a half years the stocks in the B/M
portfolio again have higher earnings levels than the average stock. The improvement
in earnings growth may lead to valuation ratios for the value portfolios that are
more in line with the market average. This is indeed the case. The average fall in
earnings is more than compensated for by a rise in the stock price, leading to an
improvement in the price-to-earnings ratio. Concluding, the differences in valuation
ratios between value and growth stocks are not justified by subsequent earnings
developments. After two years, the earnings growth rate of value stocks is equal
to the growth rate of the average stock. Hence, our findings for value strategies in
emerging markets correspond with the evidence for this behavioral explanation in
Lakonishok et al. (1994).
More recently, Doukas et al. (2002) argue that the results of Lakonishok et al.
(1994) do not imply that investors actually underestimate the growth prospects for
value stocks. To the contrary, using analysts’ earnings forecasts for the next three
years, they find that analysts are on average more (over)optimistic for value stocks
than for growth stocks. In addition, they find that value stocks have larger negative
revisions of earnings estimates than growth stocks. Based on this evidence they
conclude that the superior return performance of value stocks cannot be explained
by excessive pessimism about future earnings growth.
In our view, the evidence from Doukas et al. (2002) is not necessarily at odds
with the evidence from Lakonishok et al. (1994). It may be argued that long-term
developments are most important for equity valuation and that, hence, the three
year post-portfolio formation period considered by Doukas et al. (2002) is too short.
Analysts might overestimate the short-run earnings developments of value stocks,
but at the same time underestimate the potential for earnings growth to revert to
the mean at longer horizons. The improvement in the earnings growth rate and
the strong recovery in P/E ratio for value stocks discussed above indicate that their
long-term earnings prospects improve sharply after just a few years. We put this
hypothesis to the test using analysts’ earnings forecast errors, earnings revisions and
earnings growth forecasts, during the five years after portfolio formation.
For an individual stock, the earnings forecast error in month t, denoted FEt, is
defined only once a year, namely eight months prior to fiscal year end. In that case,
FEt is equal to the difference between the actual earnings in the current fiscal year
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(FY0t+8) and the consensus analysts’ forecast issued in month t (FY1t), expressed
as percentage of the stock price at the time of the forecast (Pt); that is FEt =
100 × (FY0t+8–FY1t)/Pt. We define the consensus forecast as the median forecast
reported by IBES. The eight month horizon is adopted from Easterwood and Nutt
(1999) and Doukas et al. (2002) and is chosen to ensure that the previous year’s
annual report was available to analysts at the time they issued their forecasts. We
also follow Easterwood and Nutt (1999) in eliminating observations for which the
forecast error is greater than 100 in absolute value. Figure 3 plots the three-month
moving average mean earnings forecast errors for the top and bottom portfolios of the
value strategies. Note that these graphs truly concerns the post-formation period,
in the sense that the leftmost point corresponds with the error for analysts’ earnings
forecasts issued in the first three months following portfolio formation. For the
B/M strategy, we observe that immediately following portfolio formation, earnings
forecast errors for the top and bottom portfolios are substantially below and above
average, respectively.6 In fact, this continues to be the case until 18 months after
portfolio formation. Hence, analysts indeed appear to be more optimistic about
the earnings prospects of value than growth stocks, as reported in Doukas et al.
(2002). In the remaining post-formation period, however, the pattern is reversed.
While the earnings forecast error for growth stocks remains close to the average, it
becomes substantially larger than average for value stocks, implying that analysts
are relatively pessimistic about value stocks’ earnings in the longer term. For the
E/P strategy, we observe a similar reversal in earnings forecast errors, although in
this case the error for growth stocks dips below average around 18 months after
portfolio formation, while for value stocks it remains at par. The implication is
however the same, namely that analysts are relatively optimistic (pessimistic) about
growth (value) stocks.
The above analysis is corroborated by the development of analysts’ earnings
6Notice that for the EWI, the forecast error is negative for each month in the post-formation
period. This demonstrates the notion that analysts are (too) optimistic about future earnings
for the average stock in the sample. In addition to systematic positive bias in analysts’ earnings
forecasts (see Easterwood and Nutt (1999) for recent evidence), the extent of this bias has also
been found to be predictable from observable firm characteristics, see Abarbanell and Bernard
(1992), among others. Analysts’ forecasts are therefore usually dismissed as being irrational or
inaccurate. A recent study by Lim (2001) shows that positively and predictably biased forecasts
may in fact be optimal if the incentive structure of analysts is taken into account. If analysts
balance forecast accuracy and improved access to management information, such biased forecasts
are rational. Furthermore, Hong and Kubik (2003) document that optimistic analysts promoting
stocks are more likely to experience favorable job separations. Hence, career concerns may also
lead to upward biases in analysts’ forecasts.
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revisions after portfolio formation, as shown in Figure 4. Analysts’ revisions are
more negative for stocks in the B/M and E/P top portfolios until 10 and 15 months
after portfolio formation, respectively, again indicating that they were too optimistic
about the earnings prospects for value stocks.7 For the B/M strategy, earnings
revisions for these stocks rise (substantially) above average between one and four
years after portfolio formation. During roughly the same period, earnings revisions
for growth stocks fall below average. For the E/P strategy, the differences are
smaller, but the earnings revisions for the top portfolio do remain above the revisions
for the bottom portfolio during the period between 15 and 48 months after portfolio
formation.
Finally, the improvement in earnings prospects is also confirmed by looking at the
developments of the earnings growth expected by analysts after portfolio formation
for each of the portfolios. Figure 5 depicts the difference between the consensus
earnings forecast for the next fiscal year (FY2) versus the most recent actual earnings
(FY0). Like in the earnings figures in Figure 2, the expected earnings change is
normalized by calculating this number as a percentage of the initially invested capital
at portfolio formation. For the E/P strategy, the expected earnings change is much
lower for the top portfolio, as to be expected. However, it reverts to the mean
quite rapidly. The expected earnings change for the top portfolio exceeds those for
the equally weighted index and for the bottom portfolio within two and three years,
respectively. For the B/M strategy, the starting point differs as the expected earnings
change at portfolio formation is already slightly higher for the top portfolio. What
is the same, however, is that the expected earnings change increases more strongly
for the top portfolio. The growth characteristics of expensive stocks based on E/P
and B/M appear to be rather short-lived.
Concluding, just like Lakonishok et al. (1994), we find that the relative cheapness
of value stocks is not justified by subsequent earnings developments. For value stocks,
earnings as percentage of the initial investment remain well above the averages for
the complete sample and for growth stocks, while both the actual earnings growth
and its forecast revert to the mean quite rapidly. Like Doukas et al. (2002), we
do find that analysts appear too optimistic about the earnings prospects for value
stocks in the short term. We also find that this reverses in the longer term as value
stocks have above average earnings forecast errors and earnings revisions after about
7Notice that for the EWI, forecast revisions are negative for each month in the post-formation
period, confirming that analysts are (too) optimistic about future earnings for the average stock in
the sample.
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one year after portfolio formation. This indicates that analysts are too pessimistic
about the long term growth perspectives for value stocks.
5.2 Momentum and Earnings Revisions Strategies
A number of studies have tested behavioral explanations for momentum strategies
in developed markets (see amongst others Chan et al. (1996), Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), Nagel (2002),
and Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004)). Underreaction and overreaction effects
are part of these explanations. In this section we investigate whether these effects
are present in the emerging markets momentum strategy as well, by examining three
variables that might serve as indicators for under- or overreaction: analysts’ earn-
ings revisions, analysts’ forecast errors and cumulative excess returns after portfolio
formation.
Chan et al. (1996) put forward a behavioral explanation for the profitability
of momentum and earnings revisions strategies, based on the idea that financial
markets respond only gradually to new information, to earnings-related news in
particular. Using a sample of US stocks, they find empirical evidence that stocks
with high price momentum or high past earnings revisions have higher returns around
earnings announcements, higher earnings revisions and higher earnings surprises for
some time after portfolio formation. Momentum and earnings revisions strategies
thus are successful because they exploit the initial underreaction of investors to the
information in past returns and past earnings revisions.
Figure 6 shows how earnings revisions for the top and bottom portfolios in the
momentum and the earnings revisions strategies and for the complete sample of
emerging market stocks develop during the five years after portfolio formation. For
both strategies, earnings revisions of the top (bottom) portfolio remain higher (lower)
than earnings revisions for the complete sample until 18 months after portfolio for-
mation.8 This agrees with the behavioral explanation of Chan et al. (1996) that the
market does not incorporate news in earnings revisions promptly.
Alternative interpretations of the observed pattern in earnings revisions are pos-
sible as well. For example, one can argue that analysts are slow in adjusting their
estimates and that earnings revisions therefore are not a good proxy for market sur-
prises. We therefore examine analysts’ forecast errors, defined as before, in Figure 7.
The patterns in this variable confirm the underreaction hypothesis: despite higher
8The difference in earnings revisions is significant for each of the first 12 months after portfolio
formation, for both the earnings revisions strategy and the momentum strategy.
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past returns and earnings revisions, stocks in the top portfolios of the momentum
and revisions strategies continue to show above average, and in fact positive forecast
errors until more than a year after portfolio formation.
Behavioral models, such as the ones in Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998),
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999), imply
that excess returns of momentum portfolios should become zero or negative after the
initial holding period. These theoretical models do not offer any guidance, however,
regarding the length of the post-holding period over which these return reversals
should occur. To further support their underreaction hypothesis, Chan et al. (1996)
show that there is no evidence of a return reversal during the first three years after
portfolio formation. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), among others, find
that a return reversal does occur when extending the post-portfolio formation period
to five years. For emerging markets, Figure 8 shows the cumulative excess returns
during the first five years after portfolio formation, both for the momentum and the
earnings revisions strategies.
For the momentum strategy, we observe a return reversal for the top portfo-
lio after approximately three years. Its magnitude is, however, not large enough
to completely annihilate the excess returns within the five year period considered.
However, the excess return on the bottom portfolio reverses after one year already,
such that after three and a half years the bottom portfolio outperforms the equally
weighted benchmark and after four years its cumulative performance is comparable
to the top portfolio. Hence, although we do not observe a return reversal as strong
as documented by Nagel (2002) for momentum strategies in the UK, we do find
that four years after portfolio formation past winners and losers can no longer be
distinguished. The results for the revisions strategy are rather different. High earn-
ings revisions stocks continue to outperform the market average after the six-month
holding period, and a return reversal does not occur during the first five years after
portfolio formation.
Concluding, the momentum strategy seems to have elements of both overreac-
tion and underreaction effects, as the analysts’ earnings revisions and forecast errors
suggest an underreaction, while the five-year post-formation returns suggest an over-
reaction. A possible solution may be found in Lee and Swaminathan (2000), who
investigate the interaction between momentum and turnover, and find different be-
havior for high turnover momentum stocks versus low turnover momentum stocks
in the US. Nagel (2002) finds similar results for the UK and relates them to im-
plicit value effects. An interesting topic for further research would be to test these
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results for emerging markets. For the earnings revisions strategy, both the earnings
revisions by analysts after portfolio formation as well as the five-year excess returns
point towards an initial underreaction. This shows that the revisions strategy has
different characteristics than the momentum strategy.
6 Conclusions
Stock selection strategies based on value, momentum and earning revisions prove to
generate significant excess returns in emerging markets. In this paper, we investigate
different explanations for the success of these strategies, using stocks included in the
IFC Investable Composite Index over the period December 1988 - June 2004.
We find little if any evidence for risk-based explanations. The excess returns
remain significant after correcting for (potentially different upside and downside)
emerging market risk, as well as after correcting for global market risk, value, size
and momentum factors. Only the performance of the momentum strategy can partly
be attributed to a global momentum risk factor.
We do find that the emerging markets results are consistent with the evidence
from developed markets concerning behavioral explanations. For value stocks, our
findings are in accordance with an overreaction explanation, as the actual and ex-
pected earnings growth of these stocks reverts to the mean in a few years and the
earnings as percentage of initial investment remains well above average. The over-
reaction explanation seems to be contradicted by the finding that value stocks have
below average (and substantially negative) earnings forecast errors and earnings re-
visions up to a year after portfolio formation. As a possible solution we suggest that
the most important behavioral bias could be related to underestimation of long-term
growth rates for value stocks. This conjecture is supported by the observation that
earnings forecast errors and earnings revisions for these stocks become above aver-
age for longer post-formation horizons and by the finding that estimated earnings
growth becomes above average within two years after portfolio formation. For the
momentum strategy, both underreaction and overreaction effects appear to be at
work. High upward earnings revisions by analysts after portfolio formation suggest
an initial underreaction. However, in the five-year post-formation period, we also
observe a strong return reversal, indicating an overreaction effect. In contrast, the
evidence does support an underreaction explanation for the earnings revisions strat-
egy. Stocks with high past earnings revisions continue to have high upward earnings
revisions for twelve months after portfolio formation, while there is no return reversal
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until at least five years after portfolio formation. As the earnings revisions strategy
seems to have no or limited overreaction effects, this sets it apart from momentum
strategies.
Of course, our results do not ‘prove’ that the behavioral explanations are correct,
nor do they refute the risk-based explanation. However, our analysis does show that
the excess returns are not simply due to higher beta or more exposure to global
factors for value, size and momentum. If the stock selection strategies are more
risky, it must be due to other risk factors that have not been identified yet. On
the other hand, the evidence for emerging markets is consistent with behavioral
explanations, although we would not qualify our findings as a complete proof. Our
conclusion for the time being is that the circumstantial evidence points towards
behavioral explanations, but more research is needed to reach a final verdict.
Such further research could involve using a broader set of risk indicators to
test whether the strategies lead to portfolios bearing more risk in dimensions not
measured by the value, size and momentum factors. A specific possibility would be
to account for macroeconomic risk explicitly, see Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)
and Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003). At the same time, a broader set of indicators that
would correlate with investor sentiment could be tested to provide further evidence
for behavioral explanations. Another source of data that could provide interesting
indicators of sentiment concerns company policies. Overoptimism of investors might
be interrelated with overoptimism of management, which could be tested by looking
for example at investment policy of the company and subsequent return on these
investments.
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Table 1: Returns of Univariate Stock Selection Strategies
Factor # Stocks Top EWI Bottom TMI t(TMI) TMB t(TMB)
B/M 576 1.46 0.93 0.74 0.53 3.76 0.73 3.39
E/P 576 1.26 0.93 0.58 0.32 3.04 0.68 3.76
6MR 576 1.30 0.93 0.58 0.36 3.51 0.74 3.75
ER FY1 489 1.03 0.79 0.45 0.24 3.13 0.59 4.80
Note: At the beginning of each month between December 1988 and June 2004, all stocks for
which the necessary information is available are ranked by country in descending order according
to the value of the factor indicated in the first column. B/M is the book-to-market ratio; E/P
is the earnings-to-price ratio; 6MR is the average return over the previous six months; ER FY1
is the past three-month average earnings revisions for the current fiscal year. For each country
equally weighted portfolios are formed from the top and bottom 15 percent of stocks, which are
combined into equally weighted internationally diversified portfolios (Top and Bottom). EWI is
the equally weighted index of all stocks in the sample. Positions are held for six months and are
not rebalanced. Monthly, non-overlapping returns are computed as the average return on the
six similar portfolios which are held during each month. Column 2 reports the average number
of stocks in the different samples. Columns 3-5 report the average returns of the Top, EWI and
Bottom portfolios, expressed as percentage per month. Columns 6-7 and 8-9 report the average
excess returns and the corresponding t-statistics of the Top Minus EWI (TMI) portfolio and the
Top Minus Bottom (TMB) portfolio, respectively.
Table 2: Subsample Returns of Univariate Stock Selection Strategies
1989.7-1994.6 1994.7-1999.6 1999.7-2004.6
Factor TMI t(TMI) TMI t(TMI) TMI t(TMI)
B/M 0.84 2.66 0.36 1.71 0.43 2.59
E/P 0.44 1.81 0.33 2.10 0.44 3.82
6MR 0.26 1.43 0.38 2.28 0.43 2.16
ER FY1 0.30 2.12 0.27 2.78 0.29 2.73
Note: The table reports the average excess returns, expressed as percentage
per month, and the corresponding t-statistics of the Top Minus EWI (TMI)
portfolio over the indicated five-year subsample periods. See Table 1 for further
details on the portfolio construction methodology.
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Table 3: Emerging Market Risk of Top and Bottom Portfolios in Stock
Selection Strategies
Strategy Portfolio α t(α) βEM t(βEM − 1) R
2
B/M
Top 0.53 3.64 1.07 3.05 0.92
Bottom −0.17 −1.52 0.96 −2.36 0.94
E/P
Top 0.34 3.04 1.00 0.12 0.95
Bottom −0.35 −3.22 1.07 4.02 0.95
6MR
Top 0.38 3.49 1.00 0.20 0.95
Bottom −0.36 −3.15 1.06 3.22 0.95
ER FY1
Top 0.25 3.16 0.98 −1.82 0.97
Bottom −0.34 −3.93 1.01 0.96 0.97
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the regression
Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βEM(REM,t − Rf,t) + εt,
where Rp,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio,
REM,t is the EWI benchmark return, and Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return.
t(α) is the t-statistic of α, and t(βEM − 1) is the t-statistic of βEM minus one. The
regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 4: Downside and Upside Emerging Market Risk of Top and Bottom Portfolios
in Stock Selection Strategies
Strategy Portfolio α− t(α−) β−
EM
t(β−
EM
− 1) α+ t(α+) β+
EM
t(β+
EM
− 1) R
2
B/M
Top −0.05 −0.15 0.99 −0.25 0.65 2.28 1.07 1.48 0.93
Bottom 0.08 0.31 1.00 −0.05 −0.16 −0.73 0.95 -1.42 0.94
E/P
Top 0.18 0.68 0.98 −0.55 0.36 1.65 1.00 0.08 0.95
Bottom −0.60 −2.34 1.02 0.63 −0.48 −2.21 1.10 2.82 0.96
6MR
Top 0.53 2.06 1.02 0.62 0.32 1.54 1.01 0.21 0.95
Bottom −0.23 −0.87 1.07 1.65 −0.52 −2.34 1.08 2.24 0.95
ER FY1
Top 0.23 1.31 0.98 −0.68 0.40 2.47 0.95 -1.81 0.97
Bottom −0.34 −1.76 1.01 0.22 −0.47 −2.60 1.04 1.21 0.97
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the regression
Rp,t − Rf,t = α
−I{REM,t−Rf,t<0} + β
−
EM
(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t<0}+
α+I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + β
+
EM
(REM,t − Rf,t)I{REM,t−Rf,t≥0} + εt,
where Rp,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted top or bottom portfolio, REM,t is the
EWI benchmark return, Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return, and I{A} is the indicator function
for the event A. t(α) is the t-statistic of α, and t(βEM − 1) is the t-statistic of βEM minus one. The
regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 5: Four-Factor Regressions for Top and Bottom Portfolios in Stock Selection Strategies
Using Global Factor Portfolios
Portfolio α t(α) βM t(βM[−1]) βHML t(βHML) βSMB t(βSMB) βUMD t(βUMD) R
2
B/M Top 0.89 1.99 0.89 −0.97 0.19 1.22 0.49 3.83 −0.13 −1.48 0.36
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.11 0.29 0.86 −1.46 0.05 0.37 0.36 3.35 −0.06 −0.73 0.41
TMI 0.54 3.53 0.03 0.77 0.06 1.06 0.06 1.51 −0.03 −0.85 −0.00
TMB 0.78 3.39 0.02 0.34 0.14 1.82 0.13 1.96 −0.07 −1.59 0.02
E/P Top 0.64 1.55 0.86 −1.29 0.18 1.27 0.45 3.87 −0.10 −1.22 0.38
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.03 0.06 0.91 −0.78 0.11 0.77 0.42 3.49 −0.14 −1.63 0.39
TMI 0.31 2.66 0.01 0.25 0.05 1.15 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.31 −0.01
TMB 0.68 3.58 −0.07 −1.35 0.07 1.01 0.02 0.45 0.04 1.03 0.02
6MR Top 0.55 1.34 0.89 −1.04 0.18 1.28 0.44 3.82 0.01 0.14 0.37
EWI 0.33 0.85 0.85 −1.50 0.13 0.99 0.42 3.82 −0.11 −1.37 0.40
Bottom 0.14 0.34 0.88 −1.10 0.09 0.63 0.42 3.62 −0.23 −2.82 0.42
TMI 0.22 2.13 0.04 1.47 0.05 1.30 0.02 0.64 0.11 5.58 0.13
TMB 0.50 2.63 0.01 0.10 0.09 1.38 0.01 0.26 0.24 6.28 0.18
ER FY1 Top 0.33 0.84 0.91 −0.92 0.22 1.58 0.39 3.49 −0.08 −0.98 0.39
EWI 0.13 0.32 0.90 −0.99 0.21 1.51 0.40 3.53 −0.09 −1.20 0.39
Bottom −0.19 −0.47 0.92 −0.75 0.16 1.13 0.40 3.46 −0.09 −1.16 0.40
TMI 0.22 2.68 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.21 −0.01 −0.51 0.02 1.08 −0.01
TMB 0.58 4.41 −0.02 −0.67 0.05 1.16 −0.01 −0.36 0.02 0.67 0.01
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the four-factor model
Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βM(RM,t − Rf,t) + βHMLRHML,t + βSMBRSMB,t + βUMDRUMD,t + εt,
where Rf,t is the 1-month US T-bill return, RM,t is the US market return, and RHML,t (High-Minus-Low), RSMB,t
(Small-Minus-Big), and RUMD,t Up-Minus-Down) are returns on US book-to-market, size and momentum factor
portfolios. Rp,t is the return on the top or bottom portfolio of a particular strategy, the corresponding sample of
emerging market stocks (EWI), or the excess return on the top portfolio relative to the equally weighted index
(TMI) or bottom portfolio (TMB). The risk-free interest rate is not included on the left-hand side in regressions
involving the TMI and TMB excess returns. t(.) is the t-statistic for the regression coefficients. t(βM[−1]) is the
t-statistic of βM minus one for the regressions with Rp,t being the return on the top or bottom portfolio or the
equally weighted index; t(βM[−1]) is the t-statistic of βM for the regressions involving the TMI and TMB excess
returns. The regression R
2
is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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(a) B/M strategy (b) E/P strategy
(c) 6MR strategy (d) ER FY1 strategy
Figure 1: 12-month moving average of monthly excess returns of the top portfolio
relative to the equally weighted index for strategies based on book-to-market (B/M),
earnings-to-price (E/P), past 6-month return (6MR), and past three-month earnings
revisions for the current fiscal year (ER FY1). The dashed line indicates the mean
monthly excess return.
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Figure 2: Earnings, expressed as percentage of initial investment, after portfolio
formation for the top portfolio of the B/M and E/P strategies and the equally
weighted index of all stocks in the sample.
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(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
Figure 3: Three-month moving average of earnings forecast errors after portfolio
formation for top and bottom portfolios of the (a) B/M strategy and (b) E/P strategy
and for the relevant equally weighted index.
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(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
Figure 4: Monthly earnings revisions after portfolio formation for top and bottom
portfolios of the (a) B/M strategy and (b) E/P strategy and for the relevant equally
weighted index, expressed as percentage.
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(a) B/M strategy
(b) E/P strategy
Figure 5: Difference between estimated earnings for the next fiscal year and the most
recent actual earnings for top and bottom portfolios of the (a) B/M strategy and (b)
E/P strategy and for the relevant equally weighted index, expressed as percentage
of initial investment.
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(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
Figure 6: Monthly earnings revisions after portfolio formation for top and bottom
portfolios of the (a) 6MR strategy and (b) ER FY1 strategy and for the relevant
equally weighted index, expressed as percentage.
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(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
Figure 7: Three-month moving average of earnings forecast errors after portfolio
formation for top and bottom portfolios of the (a) 6MR strategy and (b) ER FY1
strategy and for the relevant equally weighted index.
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(a) 6MR strategy
(b) ER FY1 strategy
Figure 8: Cumulative excess returns on top and bottom portfolios of the (a) 6MR
strategy and (b) ER FY1 strategy over the relevant equally weighted index during
60 months after portfolio formation.
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